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In Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co.,1 an Arkansas resident was
injured in Saudi Arabia by the employee of an American company
incorporated in Delaware with substantial business operations in New
York. Suit was brought in federal court in New York.2 What law
should apply to plaintiff's claim that defendant's employee negligently
harmed him and that defendant is vicariously liable for the damages
resulting from that harm?
The distinguished panelists who have addressed this question seem to
agree that their initial intuition is that Saudi law should apply as the
place ofthe conduct and injury if one ofthe parties proves what that law
is. The debate revolves around the question of whether it is constitu-
tional or otherwise permissible to apply forum law if neither party seeks
to apply Saudi law. It seems to be unanimous that it would be wrong
to apply Arkansas law (the law of the plaintiff's domicile) and that it
would be wrong to apply New York law if defendant can prove that
Saudi Arabia has a more defendant-protecting law and seeks to have it
apply.
With respect, I beg to differ. The case appears to be a Saudi case only
because the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred there. Brainerd
Currie taught us to look at such a case in a different way. First, Currie
emphasized that we should look at the policies underlying the laws of
the affectedjurisdictions, not merely the contacts with the case. It is not
determinative that the facts seem to be centered in Saudi Arabia.
Second, Currie taught us the significance of the domicile of the parties
and the places where companies do business. Although the First
Restatement gave the parties' domiciles no significance in torts cases,
Currie made the domicile determinative in certain cases. Third, Currie
taught us that it is proper and not a parochial or perverse exercise for
* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
2. 233 F.2d at 542.
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the forum to apply its own law, unless it has reason not to do so. I
submit that these three insights suggest a different result than those
proposed by most of the panelists.
At first glance, it appears that Saudi Arabia should be able to regulate
an accident occurring on its roads whether or not that accident involves
a Saudi citizen. If Saudi law were more plaintiff-favoring than the law
ofeither Arkansas or New York,providing for a higher level of damages
for example, it might have a deterrent interest in applying that law.
Higher damages might be intended to induce care on its roads. In
addition, presumably a Saudi victim would be able to recover the higher
Saudi damages against a nonresident defendant who caused harm at
plaintiff's home. A Saudi court might be moved by the arguments made
by the panelists that it would be discriminatory for a Saudi court to
refuse such damages to a plaintiff merely because that plaintiff resided
or:was domiciled in another country. Nonresidents have the right to be
protected by Saudi law while they are there, and it would be discrimina-
tion on the basis of citizenship to refuse to provide similar damages to
the nonresident plaintiff.
Suppose, however, Saudi law is not intended to be conduct-regulating
but merely loss-allocating. The courts in Saudi Arabia are persuaded by
the argument that those who are not afraid to die in automobile
accidents will not drive more carefully because they will fear the loss to
their pocketbooks. In that case, the only interest Saudi Arabia has in
extending its plaintiff-protecting law to the nonresident plaintiff is the
interest in providing the nonresident the same policeprotection granted
its own people. If the plaintiff's home state is willing to live with lower
damages,' why should Saudi Arabia impoverish a defendant doing
business in Saudi Arabia? It has no interest in doing so, does it? It
seems a perverse amount of altruism to suggest such a result.
There are two reasons Saudi Arabia would and should extend its more
plaintiff-favoring law to the nonresident plaintiff whose home state
would provide less compensation. The first is the nondiscrimination
argument rehearsed above: if a Saudi resident would obtain higher
damages, why should a Saudi court deny those same damages to a
nonresident injured in Saudi Arabia? The second argument is that the
courts in Saudi Arabia have an interest in making a defendant
compensate a plaintiff injured in Saudi Arabia because it is the right
thing to do; defendants have no right to commit harm with impunity.
The place ofthe injury has the legitimate power and obligation to ensure
that there is a remedy for the infringement of the plaintiff's right to
bodily security.
Notice that both of these reasons for applying Saudi law are reasons
ofjustice. Some scholars have misread Currie's analysis to suggest that1997] JUSTICE & CONFLICT OF LAWS 833
a state is interested in applying its law only if that application will
enrich one of its domiciliaries. This suggests that the only reason states
impose damages on their residents is to alter their behavior and
encourage investment in safety; it presumes that choice-of-law analysis
should be relentlessly consequentialist. But surely this is wrong. States
adopt laws both because they intend to alter behavior and because they
want to dojustice. Rules oftorts, contracts, and property can bejustified
by consequentialist reasons, but they can also be justified by reference
to rights, fairness, and justice.
I am a Property professor and perhaps can best state this in property
terms. The defendant committed a wrong to the plaintiff, and under
Saudi law (by hypothesis), defendant owes plaintiff damages. The
defendant has a pot of money that, by rights, belongs to the plaintiff.
The place of the conduct and injury has the legitimate power to rectify
a wrong committed in its territory, and it is not obligated to register
indifference because the parties are noncitizens.
So far, my analysis seems to vindicate the intuition that Saudi law
should apply to the case. If Saudi law is more plaintiff-favoring, it has
reasons of both deterrence and fairness to apply its law to the nonresi-
dents. Moreover, neither the plaintiff's nor the defendant's home states
in the United States claim the right to immunize them from liability for
their torts elsewhere. But let us assume now that Saudi law has no
deterrent purpose. Is the case so easy? Although it is true a Saudi
court would be likely to apply its own law if it thought that failing to do
so would both constitute an injustice and be discriminatory, it is not so
clear that a court in New York would or should do the same thing.
Consider the following: Currie told us that it might make sense for the
outcome in a case to differ, depending on which court heard the case.
Unlike most choice-of-law scholars, I agree wholeheartedly with this
assessment.
Remember that we have taken away the deterrent purpose from Saudi
law. It is possible a New York court would find that the New York
company which does substantial business in Saudi Arabia and injures
an Arkansas resident need not pay the high damages authorized by
Saudi Arabia if the goal is to do justice. Think about it. A Mexican
company does business in the United States and injures a Mexican
resident on the roads of Texas. If the plaintiff were to obtain U.Si-style
damages, he might be able to retire in Mexico in luxury. Even though
a Texas court might be justified in applying Texas law (because it would
be discriminatory to deny the visitor the benefits of Texas law while
there), a Mexican court might see it differently. Texas law has no
deterrent purpose, and the plaintiff certainly did not travel to Texas in
reliance on the possibility of obtaining a high damages award if he were834 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
injured there. A Mexican court might see before it a Mexican company
and a Mexican victim and remind us that Currie suggested the place
where a contract is signed or an accident occurs is not necessarily the
place whose law should be applied. In fact, many scholars believe the
main result of Currie's analysis was to suggest that in cases of loss
allocation, courts should apply the law of the common domicile, not the
law of the place of the injury. In such a case, the Mexican court might
feel that it was adequately compensating its resident while eschewing
impoverishment ofa resident defendant and that no legitimate interests
of Texas were being infringed. The fact that a Texas court might be
compelled to apply Texas law (to avoid the appearance or reality of
discrimination) does not mean that a Mexican court need do this.
If this analogy is apt, a New Yorkcourt might see before it a plaintiff
and a defendant from states whose laws are identical. Although a Saudi
court might award higher damages, would it be so out of place for the
New Yorkcourt to say that it makes no sense to impoverish a New York
company to benefit an Arkansas plaintiff when the plaintiff's own state
considers New York-styledamages adequate and the place ofthe conduct
has no conduct-regulating policies to suggest a different result? Given
that the forum's view of the just result accords with that of plaintiff's
domicile, why not apply forum law?
Now let us assume, as most of the panelists seemed to assume, that
Saudi law is more defendant-protecting than the law ofeither Arkansas
or New York. Let us assume, for example, that Saudi Arabia eschews
the doctrine of vicarious liability and promotes traffic safety by
regulatory laws (such as traffic signs and lights) and criminal laws
(enforced by police charges imposing fines for unsafe driving), but
refuses to allow negligence lawsuits of any kind in the context of
automobile accidents.
If I read correctly, everyone felt that the law ofthe plaintiff's domicile
could not be applied. But think about it. Why exclude the interests of
the plaintiff's domicile so cavalierly? The plaintiff's domicile is surely
interested, as Currie would put it, in compensating its resident. And
even though New York has no interest in regulating the conduct of its
residents around the world, it surely would find no injustice in making
the defendant pay damages to the injured plaintiff rather than allowing
defendant to get away without liability under Saudi law. This is
effectively a common domicile case with both parties coming from states
that impose negligence liability. A result that leaves plaintiff with
nothing is, from the standpoint of the forum, an unjust result.
Here is where I differ from Larry Kramer's ingenious and seductive
suggestion that we should be positivists and ask whether any state gives
plaintiff a remedy. Currie taught us to view forum law as the residual1997] JUSTICE & CONFLICT OF LAWS 835
result for one good reason: forum law represents the forum's view of
justice as it sees it. I am not arguing for natural law or a brooding
omnipresence in the sky; I am arguing that the forum has an interest in
seeing justice done in its courts between parties who are properly before
it. If the case is dismissed without a remedy, it would not be as easy as
Kramer might suggest to conclude that no court gave plaintiff a remedy.
If this is our view,the question is why? Why does no state give plaintiff
a remedy? Specifically, why does the forum not give the plaintiff a
remedy? Why does the forum leave the plaintiff injured and penniless?
Ordinarily, it would not do so;it would consider such a result unconscio-
nable. Doesn't the forum have an interest in doingjustice, as it sees it?
I submit that there are two reasons, and two reasons only, for
eschewing what New York sees as the just result when the plaintiff's
home state has an interest in seeing plaintiff compensated: justified
expectations and comity. If defendant relied on Saudi Arabia's
defendant-protecting law in shaping its conduct and in determining how
much insurance to buy, it might be unfair to subject the New York
defendant to New York or Arkansas law around the world. However,
given that neither the defendant nor the court knew what Saudi law was
even at the time of trial, it is impossible to conclude that there is any
unfairness in holding defendant liable for its negligence. If it were
determined that Saudi law provided no remedy, it would be an
unexpected windfall to defendant--analogous to winning the lottery.
Moreover, even if one could say that defendant knew it would not be
liable for the torts ofits employees committed in Saudi Arabia and relied
on. that knowledge, the case is still not a false conflict. If we are
avoiding what the forum views as the fair result in order to protect
defendant's expectations, it is important to remember that for every
rights argument defendant makes, plaintiff may have a plausible rights
argument of his own. Here it is simply that Saudi law is unjust.
Defendant will argue that plaintiff impliedly consented to Saudi law by
going there, but this argument proves too much. Although it is
appropriate for a Saudi court to apply Saudi law,it is not so certain that
it is appropriate for a New York court to leave an Arkansas plaintiff
without a remedy for an injury committed by a New York company;
defendant may have a right to rely on the law ofthe place where it acts,
but plaintiff also has a right to minimal justice, as the forum sees it.
The question is whether defendant's rights outweigh plaintiff's rights, or
which right should take precedence? Given, however, that defendant
seems not to have relied on knowledge of the immunizing Saudi law, it
would be unjust and inappropriate for the New York court to promote
what it sees as an unjust result in order to protect defendant's expecta-
tions when defendant had no expectations to protect.836 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
The second possible reason for applying Saudi law is to respect the
ability of Saudi Arabia to govern events centered there. This comity
interest of the forum manifests itself when application of forum law
would interfere with the ability ofanother state to enforceits regulatory
policies. What interest does Saudi Arabia have in leaving plaintiff
without a remedy? One possibility is that such a defendant-protecting
law promotes investment in Saudi Arabia. Moreover,application ofNew
York law to a New York company for an accident arising out of its
business in Saudi Arabia would put it at a competitive advantage.
However, it is difficult to believe that Saudi law concerning automobile
accidents is intended to, or has the effect of, promoting foreign invest-
ment in Saudi Arabia, particularly when the defendant did not even
know what that law was. If the Saudi law is not investment-promoting,
application of Saudi law would infringe on the interests of plaintiff's
domicile (leaving it to deal with the consequences of his injury) and
would violate the forum's sense ofjustice. This would leave a defendant
who does substantial business in New Yorkfree of a legal obligation it
would otherwise incur under New York law, without in any way
advancing the legitimate interests of either the defendant or of Saudi
Arabia. In such a situation, why should the forum promote an unjust
result?
Currie was correct to focus on state interests, to teach us about the
interests of the plaintiff's domicile, and to suggest reasons for making
forum law the presumptively applicable law. Tothose reasons, I want
to add the forum's interest in seeing justice done under the standards
provided by forum law, especially when plaintiff is domiciled in a state
that agrees with forum standards. In such cases, the only real question
is whether there are sufficient reasons of multistate policy to justify a
result different from forum law. Those reasons might include protection
of a defendant's justified expectations or promotion of the ability of a
state to regulate events centered there to achieve important public
purposes. If both ofthese reasons are absent, the forum has an interest
in substantive justice. In such cases, it is not correct to state that no
state gives the plaintiff a remedy. The domicile of the parties is a
sufficient connecting factor to apply the common law of their domiciles
when the rule at issue is a loss-allocating rule. The forum has an
interest in promoting substantive justice in such cases, and the conflict
of laws in no way prevents the forum from achieving such a result.